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CHINESE AND WESTERN WORLDVIEWS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW, POLICY, AND WAR* 
Jeffrey C. Tuomalat 
Chinese and Western worldviews differ significantly, with impli-
cations for law and policy, particularly in the context of the use of 
force in international relations. It is commonly assumed that Chinese 
and Western worldviews or cultures each has an essential unity, or has 
at least developed on a continuum, over the millennia. That assump-
tion may be sound with regard to the Chinese, but not to the Western 
worldview. The Christian West embraces a worldview that differs 
fundamentally from that of the pre-Christian West and the post-
Christian West, which enabled it to develop and sustain the rule of law 
unique to the Western legal tradition. Certain fundamental characteris-
tics of the Chinese worldview are remarkably similar to those of the 
pre-Christian and post-Christian West, but strikingly different from 
those of the Christian West. The true dividing line between philoso-
phical and ethical perspectives does not fall between Chinese and 
Western worldviews; it falls between non-Christian and Christian 
worldviews. Only a Christian worldview, with its distinctive cosmol-
ogy and social order, can birth and sustain the rule of law and its cor-
relative distinction between law and policy. 
Cosmology1 and social order provide the focal points for compar-
ing and contrasting these two fundamentally distinct and competing 
This article is an adaptation of a paper titled "On War and Jnstice: Na-
tional Interest, International Law and Cooperation in an Age of Terrorism," which 
the author presented at a February 2004 conference hosted by the University of Den-
ver's Center for China-United States Cooperation and co-sponsored by the Associa-
tion for Christian Conferences Teaching and Service. The topic of the conference 
was "Chinese and Western Values: Is International Cooperation in Fighting Terror-
ism Possible?" 
t Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Liberty Uni-
versity School of Law. B.S., The Ohio State University, 1973; J.D., Capital Univer-
sity School of Law, 1976; LL.M., George Washington School of Law, 1984. Colo-
nel, United States Marine Corps Reserve (Ret.). 
1 
"Cosmology," as used herein, refers to that branch of philosophy dealing 
with the origin and structure of the universe and the relation of God and man in it. 
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worldviews. In the Christian West, a basic cosmological dualism 
sharply distinguishes between the Creator and His creation. The Chris-
tian West is also marked by a multiplicity of social-groups with over-
lapping and competing jurisdictions. These two characteristics gave 
rise to the ideology of the rule of law along with institutions that could 
implement it. The Chinese and non-Christian West adhere to a basic 
cosmological monism with no clear distinction between the Creator 
and His creation. The resulting tendency is to destroy group pluralism 
by undermining the multiplicity of political jurisdictions and blurring 
the distinctions between political, familial, and religious institutions. 
As a consequence, China and the non-Christian West are incapable of 
developing or sustaining the particular type of legal order based on the 
rule of law that is unique to the Western legal tradition. 
Part I of this article briefly considers the uses of the terms "West" 
and "Western" and explains why the Christian culture that prevailed in 
Western Europe between 400 A.D. and 1800 A.D. must be distin-
guished from Western societies that preceded and followed that pe-
riod. 
Part II compares and contrasts Chinese and Western worldviews at 
the points of cosmology and social order, drawing upon two Western 
writers, Augustine and Unger, and three Chinese writers, Zhang, Yao, 
and Shi. 
Augustine represents the worldview of the Christian West. He 
broke with Greek and Roman thought in holding that man is a created 
being, entirely distinct from God the Creator. The Christian view of 
the church, as a corporate body of believers in Jesus Christ, separate 
and distinct from family and state, owes much to Augustine and is of 
fundamental importance for social ordering in the Christian West. 2 
Two articles by contemporary Chinese authors are particularly in-
structive in setting forth essential elements of the Chinese worldview 
in the context of the use of force in international relations. General 
Zhang Junbo and Colonel Yao Yunzhu attribute what they deem to be 
a sharp contrast between Chinese and Western decision-making to 
differing cosmologies.3 Professor Shi Yinhong, while not discounting 
2 
"Church," as used herein, is not a generic term signifYing religious institn-
tions. Nor does it signifY a particular denomination within Christianity. It signifies 
men and women who have placed their faith in Christ for salvation and thus form the 
corpus Christian!, i.e., the Body of Christ. See. e.g., Colossians I :24; Ephesians 
5:29; 1 Corinthians 12:12-31. 
3 Zhang Junbo & Yao Yunzhu, Differences Between Traditional Chinese and 
Western Military Thinking and Their Philosophical Roots, 5 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 209 
(1996). 
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Chinese-Western differences, places considerable emphasis on sug-
gested points of similarity, especially as related to the matter of social 
d . 4 or enng. 
Roberto Unger contrasts China and the Christian West on the bases 
of cosmology and social order. 5 Professor Unger's analysis is particu-
larly useful in that it treats the relationship of law and policy generally, 
rather than in the limited context of the use of force. Unger contends 
that a legal order based on rule of law developed in the West and not 
in China because of Western beliefs regarding cosmology and forms 
of social order. In the Christian West, law came to be viewed as dis-
tinct from policy, with its own institutions, values, and methodology. 
Part III analyzes the relationship of law and policy in making deci-
sions to go to war as developed in the West. It demonstrates that the 
distinction, and relationship, between law and policy are based upon a 
particular Western Christian cosmology and view of social order. 
Zhang and Y ao assert that the main difference between China and the 
West in this regard is that Chinese decisions are based on "justice" 
while Western decisions are based on "interest. "6 Their criticism may 
be accurate regarding the pre-Christian and post-Christian West, but it 
is not an accurate assessment of the Christian West. 
Augustine was perhaps not only the greatest theologian of the 
church, but his writings were also seminal for the development of just 
war doctrine. Just war doctrine in the Christian West, because of its 
foundational worldview, maintains the distinction between law and 
policy, thus placing "justice" (law) into proper relationship with "in-
terest" (policy). 
PART I-WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE WESTERN? 
Use of the terms "West" and "Western" can be ambiguous. Several 
approaches have been taken in defining "West," each of which is 
somewhat helpful, but none of which is totally satisfactory. The sim-
plest approach is to define "West" in terms of longitude on a map. 
This approach, however, is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive of 
cultures that are commonly identified as Western. An approach from 
the Cold War era is to identifY East and West based on political differ-
4 See Shi Yinhong, Chinese and Western Ethical Traditions and Interna-
tional Intervention, 6 REGENT J. lNT'L L. 69 (2007). 
5 ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, The Chinese Case: A Comparative Analy-
sis. in LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 86-109 
(1976). 
6 Zhang & Yao, supra note 3, at210. 
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ences, but this approach has become passe with the fall of the Soviet 
empire. 
The term "Western" is often used to designate cultures originating 
in ancient Greece and Rome, developing in Christian Europe, and con-
tinuing (with inclusion of certain of its colonial offspring) in modem 
Europe. 7 However, it is difficult to discern the logic that justifies plac-
ing such disparate cultures as pagan Greece, seventeenth century Eng-
land, and present-day France under the common designation "West-
em." 
Another approach to defming Western culture as spanning from 
ancient Greece to modem Europe is to treat the Christian era as some-
thing of an unhappy parenthesis in history, running from the fall of the 
Western Roman Empire to the Renaissance. Victor Davis Hanson 
tends toward that approach.8 At the same time, Hanson identifies cer-
tain characteristics common to Western culture, as contrasted with 
Eastern cultures, which he believes explain the success of Western 
culture in its military clashes with the non-West.9 
Harold Berman identifies "Western" with that part of Europe and 
its colonial progeny in which the Western church, in both its Roman 
Catholic and Protestant forms, has been dominant during the period of 
time from the eleventh century to the present. 10 Although Berman's 
identification of "Western" is arguably too restrictive, he makes two 
important points for present purposes. First, Western Christian culture 
is essentially different from Greco-Roman culture and is not an out-
growth of it. 11 Second, the freedom of the Western church from the 
control of civil government and its vitality as a competitive polity, 
distinct from state and family, were necessary conditions for the de-
velopment of the Western legal tradition. 12 
7 See generally CARLE CLARK ZIMMERMAN, FAMILY AND CNILIZATION 
(1947). 
8 See generally VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, CARNAGE AND CULTURE: 
LANDMARK BATTLES IN THE RISE OF WESTERN POWER (2001). 
9 !d. 
10 HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE 
WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 14 (1983). 
11 See id. at 148-51 (showing that although Western Europeans received or 
rediscovered legal texts from the Roman Empire, they transformed the meaning of 
those texts in large measure through the application ofthe scholastic method). 
12 See id. at 5, 18-19 (explaining that this tradition, though greatly weakened 
through the destructive influences of the French and Russian Revolutions, still dis-
tinguishes the West from the rest of the world). 
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In this article, the term "Christian West" means the period of time 
from the fifth to the nineteenth century and covering the territory pri-
marily of Western Europe and certain of its colonial offspring. The 
period of time from the nineteenth century to the present is referred to 
as the "post-Christian West." 
The Christian West begins with the fifth century because it is the 
time during which Augustinian theology began its rise to primacy. 
Augustine's theology was the most comprehensive, consistently or-
thodox, and influential of the early church. He made a decisive break 
with Greek philosophy, articulating a cosmology that maintained a 
distinction between the Creator and His creation, and he laid a founda-
tion for a social order in which the church became a separate institu-
tion from the state.13 Additionally, Augustine first articulated a just 
war doctrine based on Christian theology that prevailed in the West 
until the nineteenth century.14 Just war doctrine provides an exemplar 
for formulating the relationship between law and policy in the Western 
legal tradition. 
The post-Christian West began during the nineteenth century when 
the legal positivism of John Austin/5 built upon the utilitarian phi-
losophy of Jeremy Bentham, 16 began its rise to ascendancy. Law came 
to be viewed merely as an instrument of social control, separate from 
any objective morality or higher law. Accordingly, Western nations 
increasingly viewed the use of force in international relations as based 
on interest rather than justice. 
Classical international law, as summarized in the works ofGrotius 
and Vattel,17 was premised upon a superintending law of God that 
governs nations. Once Austin's definition of law as the command of 
the political sovereign was accepted, the basis for international law 
was destroyed. In international relations, if there is no political sover-
13 
14 
!d. at 109-10. 
!d. at 110. 
15 JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED passim 
(Isaiah Berlin et al. eds., Wedenfeld & Nicolson 1968) (1832) (discussing divine 
laws, positive law, positive morality, and laws metaphorical or figurative). 
16 BHIKHU C. PAREKH, JEREMY BENTHAM: CRITICAL ASSESSMENTS 28 (1993) 
("Austin was the direct juristic heir of Bentham."); JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN 
GENERAL(1970). 
17 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RJGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE passim (Richard Tuck, 
ed. Liberty Fund, Inc. 2005) (1625); EMERJCH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; 
OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF 
NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS passim (Chicago, T. & J. W. Johnson & Co. publ'g 
1863) (1775). 
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eign, logically there can be no law. Without law, the only basis for 
conducting international relations is national interest. National interest, 
rather than just cause, provides positivists the only 'Justification" nec-
essary for the use of force. 
The nineteenth centnry also gave birth to two ideologies-
materialism and evolution18---completely at odds with the Christian 
doctrine of creation and its Creator-creature distinction. As a result, 
the fate of society based on the rule of law, which was distinct from 
interest-group politics and utilitarian ethics, was further sealed. The 
state's rapid rise to primacy as the most powerful social institution 
paralleled the development of non-Christian ideology and legal posi-
tivism. The church (as well as the family) became increasingly mar-
ginalized, yet it was the church in particular that historically had sus-
tained the Christian worldview and served as a restraint on the state. 
PART II-CONTRASTING WORLDVIEWS: CHRISTIAN WEST AND CHINESE 
A. Augustine 
Augustine is the most influential theologian in the history of the 
Christian West. His writings on the doctrine of creation (cosmology) 
and "the City of God" (social order)19 are particularly important for 
laying the groundwork for a Christian worldview distinct from that of 
non-Christian thought. A particular product of Augustine's worldview 
was his formulation of just war doctrine, which was seminal for theol-
ogy and for international law. It was in the development of the just war 
doctrine that the relationship between law and policy, or as Zhang and 
Yao write, the difference between 'justice" and "interest," was worked 
out.2o 
Augustine's articulation of the Christian. doctrine of God the Crea-
tor as distinct from man the creature decisively severed the syncretistic 
influence that Greek philosophy, especially Platonism, had on Chris-
18 Jonatas E. M. Machado, Freedom of Religion: A View from Europe, 10 
ROGER WILLIAMS U.L. REV. 451,463 (2005). 
19 The works of Augustine number more than 100 titles, including SAINT 
AUGUSTINE, ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE (D.W. Robertson, Jr., trans. 1958) (the first 3 
books were finished in 396-397 and the fourth book was finished in 426) and SAINT 
AUGUSTINE, 11lE CITY OF GOD (Demetrius B. Zerna & Gerald G. Walsh, trans. 1950) 
(413-426) (consisting of22 books). 
20 Zhang & Yao, supra note 3, at212-13. 
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tian theology.21 Augustine is also attributed in large measure with es-
tablishing the concept of a strong institutional church that would serve 
to counter pagan Greek and Roman notions of an all-inclusive social 
order under the governance of the state. 22 His views would further 
serve to counter the unitary social order based on the family that 
dominated Germanic tribalism and that continued well into the Middle 
Ages.23 
A syncretism of pagan Greek philosophy, in its Aristotelian form, 
and Christian theology emerged in the church during the high Middle 
Ages, largely through the influence of Thomas Aquinas.24 That syn-
cretism, which forms the basis for modern Roman Catholic thought,25 
works to undermine the Creator-creature distinction and provides a 
false understanding of the relationship between faith and reason. 26 The 
21 2 CORNELIUS VAN TIL, IN DEFENSE OF BIBLICAL CHRISTIANITY: A SURVEY 
OFCHRISTIANEPISTEMOWGY 51 (1977). 
Id. 
According to Plato, man is not created in the image of God because there is 
no God sufficiently absolute to create man in his own image. In the Platonic 
story of creation God looks up to Ideas that are next to him and is condi-
tioned by material that is independent of him. Plato's God does not carry 
within him the ultimate principle of unity and diversity, but he is looking 
for it. Hence man's knowledge caunot be an impress of God's knowledge. 
If God did try to impress his knowledge upon man it would naturally be re-
garded as an imposition by man because he was more or less God's equal. 
Thus Plato and Augustine stand once more opposed to one another. 
22 B.B. WARFIELD, CALVIN AND AUGUSTINE 313 (Samuel G. Craig ed., 1956). 
It was particularly in the doctrine of the Church, which [Augustine] thus 
took up and transfigured, that he became in a true sense the founder of Ro-
man Catholicism, and thus called into being a new type of Christianity, in 
which "the idea of the Church became the central power in the religious 
feeling" and "in ecclesiastical activity" "in a fashion which has remained 
unknown in the East." 
Id (citation omitted). 
23 See BERMAN, supra note 10, at 62-68, 226-30 (explaining that tribalism is 
still a more powerful force in much of the world than religion or nationalism). See 
also ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 470. 
24 BERMAN, supra note 10, at 246, 279. 
25 See C. Scott Pryor, God's Bridle: John Calvin's Application of Natural 
Law, 22 J. L. & RELIG. 225, 234-35 n.52 (2006-07). 
26 CORNELIUS VAN TIL, THE REFORMED PASTOR & MODERN THOUGHT 90-91, 
96-97 (1974). 
Calvin argued that no man can know himself without at the same time 
knowing himself as a creature of God. No man can observe the facts of na-
ture and history round about him without seeing clearly manifested in them 
the all-controlling and judging activity of the Creator-Redeemer God. Tho-
mas [Aquinas] starts from the abstract concept of Being and introduces the 
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Protestant Reformation marked a return to the orthodox theology of 
Augustine and has been appropriately viewed as an Augustinian re-
vival.27 The Reformation had implications not only for cosmology but 
also for social ordering. Although Western Europe had long been 
based on a multiplicity of competing and overlapping jurisdictions, it 
was in those countries most influenced by Reformed theology that 
jurisdictional boundaries, now largely eroded, were most clearly 
drawn between family, church, and state. It was also in those countries 
most influenced by Reformed theolo~ that the political forms of re-
publicanism and federalism flourished. 8 
1. Created Order 
One of the fundamental doctrines that distinguishes Christian 
thought from non-Christian thought is the doctrine of creation. Chris-
tians believe in creation ex nihilo (out of nothing) by a pre-existing 
and eternally self-sufficient God; the created order is not merely an 
!d. 
Creator-creature distinction afterwards. He reduces the Creator-creature 
distinction to something that is consistent with the idea of God and the 
cosmos as involved in a chain of being, with varying degrees of intensity. 
His philosophy and psychology thus make any true Christian theology im-
possible. 
If Thomas, the theologian, hears by revelation that God has created the uni-
verse out of nothing and he tells this to Thomas, the philosopher, the latter 
will answer that he cannot know this to be the case, indeed that he will 
never be able to know such a thing to be so. He must add that the nature of 
reality does not allow for any such thing to be so. For surely faith will never 
teach anything that is out of accord with right reason, and has God not 
given reason to man? Thomas maintains that fuith takes over where reason 
cannot go. But what will he do when both ''reason" and "faith" make con-
tradictory statements abont the nature of reality? In other words, the argu-
ment with respect to the first mover is an argument about the nature of the 
whole of reality that is utterly out of accord with the nature of this reality as 
it is said to be in the Christian religion. 
27 VAN Tn., supra note 21, at I 00-0 I. 
28 See generally Herbert D. Foster, International Calvinism Through Locke 
and the Revolution of 1688, 32 THE AM. HIST. REv. 475 (1927) (discussing reformed 
theology and its impact on political theories of government); DONALD LUTZ, THE 
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 86-87 (1988) (discussing why Ameri-
cans of the founding era believed they were capable of self-government). 
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extension of God, nor an emanation from Him, nor is it shaped out of 
something equally pre-existing or independent of God.29 
The modem attack on the doctrine of creation, led by those who 
hold to a monistic cosmology, generally claims to be "scientific" in 
nature. Actually, this is primarily a philosophical and theological at-
tack on the worldview that produced the Western legal tradition and 
the Western social order. The destructive impact of the modem state's 
censorship of "creationism" in public schools is much greater on mat-
ters of ethics, law, and social order than it is upon operative biology. 
Unless God is prior to, distinct from, and independent of the created 
order, He cannot be the lawgiver. In fact, He would be subject to the 
same "law" to which man is subject. 
The ancient Greeks were presented with the same basic cosmo-
logical options as the ancient Chinese philosophers. They had compet-
ing conceptions of God as wholly transcendent (like the Chinese 
Shang Ti, lord-on-high) or as wholly immanent (like the Chinese 
T'ien, heaven). 30 The Greeks, like the Chinese, opted by and large for 
the immanent. Cornelius Van Til points out the distinction between 
Augustinian Christianity and pagan Greek thought: 
[I]t remains to be proved that anyone of the Greeks ever 
thought of the universe as God's creation. The term creation is 
used, to be sure, but the connotation of the term creation in 
Greek philosophy is always determined by the fact that the 
29 2 FREDERICK COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 74 (1950). 
A doctrine which was not developed by pagan thinkers, but which was 
held by Augustine in common with other Christian writers, was that of the 
creation of the world out of nothing by God's free act .... The doctrine of 
free creation out of nothing is not to be found in neo-Platonism, if we ex-
cept one or two pagan thinkers who had most probably been influenced by 
Christian teaching. Augnstine may have thought that Plato had taught crea-
tion out of nothing in time, but it is improbable, in spite of Aristotle's inter-
pretation of the Timaeus, that Plato really meant to imply this. However, 
whatever Augustine may have thought about Plato's views on the matter, he 
himself clearly states the doctrine of free creation out of nothing and it is 
essential to his insistence on the utter supremacy of God and the world's en-
tire dependence on Him. All things owe their being to God. 
!d. (citation omitted). 
A myriad of Bible passages present God as Creator, from the first book to the last. 
Genesis 1:1 (NIV) ("In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth."); 
Revelation 4:11 (NIV) ("You are worthy, our Lord and God, to receive glory and 
honor and power, for you created all things, and by your will they were created and 
have their being."). 
30 UNGER, supra note 5, at 101-05. 
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universe is thought of as having an eternal or semi-eternal exis-
tence alongside of the existence of God. And if such is the 
creation concept of Greek thought, it is impossible that the 
immanence of God in the universe could mean anything else 
than a sort of identity with the universe. The God of Greek phi-
losophy is either exclusively deistic or exclusively pantheis-
. 3! 
tic. 
One logical implication of a worldview in which man and "God" 
are one, and equally subject to the laws of the universe, is to assume 
the "naturalness" of the social order and customary norms of behavior 
(like /i of Chinese culture )32 Although such a worldview might pro-
vide some hope for developing universal customs, it does not explain 
the existing disharmony or offer a satisfactory way of realizing the 
essential oneness that supposedly inheres in reality. Instead, it calls for 
reliance upon the wise man or shaman who has more insight into these 
matters than others and can explain the universe to us33 This seems to 
track with Zhang's and Yao' s view of "heavenly laws" (tiandao) and 
"inner life" (neizai xingming).34 The "heavenly laws" and "inner life" 
have a necessary correspondence because all is one; therefore, the 
world can be understood by looking inward. In such a universe, law 
can have legitimacy only insofar as all men concur as to what custom 
requires. 
The other logical implication of a worldview in which man and 
God are one is that man and God are equally free to impose their will 
upon the universe. Those who have the most wisdom will use law as a 
creation of the human will-that is, positive law (like fa in Chinese 
culture)35-to impose an order they choose. Still, law will have legiti-
macy only insofar as all agree as to what order to establish by means 
of positive law. 
Id 
31 VANTrr.,supranote2l,atl6. 
32 See UNGER, supra note 5, at 93-96. 
33 VANTIL,supranote2l, at45. 
The conclusion of the whole of Greek speculation was that all things are at 
bottom one. Epistemologically expressed, this amounts to saying that there 
can be only one type of mind. The human and the divine mind can never 
differ in any other way than quantitatively .... The minds of both God and 
man are placed within a universe that is larger and more original than, or as 
original as, themselves. 
34 
35 
Zhang & Yao, supra note 3, at 216. 
See UNGER, supra note 5, at 101-05. 
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Those who find themselves under the sway of the positivists' legal 
order have no higher law to which they may appeal when they find 
their necks under the heel of the positivists' boot. Officials who sin-
cerely desire to do what is right have no certainty of what is required 
unless they have the laws of God to guide them. Western liberal soci-
ety had an ideological basis for a rule of law, but surrendered it while 
still claiming allegiance to the rule oflaw. 36 
The question is whether the West can maintain a legal order based 
on the rule of law without maintaining the faith that sustained it. 37 The 
answer is no. Western society has retnrned to the type of legal system 
that marks Chinese society. The only appeals are to custom and force. 
There is no higher law with which to question the legitimacy of cus-
tom or stand in judgment of the sovereign's command. 
2. Kingdom of God 
In The City of God, Augustine gives the reader a panoramic view 
of human history and depicts the scene as a battleground between two 
ethical realms, the City of God and the City of Man.38 Although the 
City of God is to extend over the entire earth and many of its citizens 
are civil rulers, it is not to be equated with a political entity having 
universal jurisdiction. Some citizens of a particular nation are citizens 
of the City of God, and some are not; even families have diverse citi-
zenship, some members being citizens in the City of Man and some in 
the City of God. 
The City of God is not to be equated with the Christian church; al-
though, hopefully, most people in the visible church are also citizens 
of the City of God.39 The implications for social ordering are mani-
36 See id. at 166-81 (stating that "liberal society" is that form of organization 
characterized by multiple social groups and rule of law based in a religion of tran-
scendence). 
Id 
37 Id. at 83. Unger asks: 
What happens when the positive rules of the state lose all touch with a 
higher law and come to be seen as nothing more than the outcomes of a 
power struggle? Can the ideals of autonomy and generality in law survive 
tbe de1nise of the religious beliefs that presided over their birtb? 
38 18 AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 413-26 (Marcus Dods trans., Great 
Books ed., Encyclopredia Britannica 1952) (n.d). 
39 BERMAN, supra note 10, at 109 ("Contrary to what is sometimes supposed, 
St. Augustine did not identify the City of God with the Christian Church as such, nor 
did he identify the Earthly City with the Roman Empire or with the state in gen-
eral."). 
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fold. The church does have a unique mission that is separate and dis-
tinct from the family and the state. The church alone has a universal 
mission in the geographic sense, but its jurisdiction is limited in terms 
of the governmental powers it exercises. The church has primary re-
sponsibility for extending the City of God by making disciples of all 
nations, baptizing, and teaching people the laws of God, 40 yet it does 
not stand in a hierarchical relationship of superiority to the state and 
family. 
The state has been given the authority to use force, but that power 
is not able to make nations embrace democracy or some other ideol-
ogy, change people's lives, or convict individuals of the truth. The 
territorial jurisdiction of the state is also limited. In the City of God, 
the family and church have separate jurisdictions from the state.41 Not 
only is there a multiplicity of states, there is a multiplicity of groups 
within society. The church does not rule over family or over the state; 
the family does not rule over church and state. The state does not ab-
sorb family and church as was the case in the pre-Christian West and 
is the tendency in the modern post-Christian states. 
After the Papal Revolution in the eleventh century, the Christian 
West developed a basic social order distinct from Eastern Christen-
dom. In the great struggle known as the Investiture Controversy, the 
Western church asserted, and was able to effect, the independence of 
the church from the state.42 That fission of church and state, not to be 
confused with modern notions of the separation of God from state, was 
the catalyst for a number of other developments that further separated 
Western and Eastern Christendom.43 Most importantly, for present 
purposes, the church in the West provided a model and a catalyst for 
the development of the rule oflaw in the civil realm. 44 
Id 
40 Matthew 28:18-20 {NIV). 
Then Jesus came to them and said, "All authority in heaven and on earth 
has been given to me. Therefore go and make disciples of all nations, bap-
tizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, 
and teaching them to do everything I have commanded you. And snrely I 
am with you always, to the very end of the age." 
41 
42 
43 
44 
AUGUSTINE, supra note 38, at 515, 519-522. 
BERMAN, supra note 10, at 87, 97-99. 
AUGUSTINE, supra note 38, at 520-21. 
See BERMAN, supra note 10, at 99-119. 
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3. Just War 
Augustine's writings on the topic of the law of war are of continu-
ing and particular relevance. Just war doctrine, as developed in the 
Christian West, also demonstrates how the Christian worldview sus-
tains the proper relationship between "justice" and "interest," or be-
tween law and policy. The theological basis for just war doctrine and 
the resulting relationship between law and policy is developed in Part 
III, below, comparing the Augustinian or Christian West view of just 
war and making decisions to use force in international relations, with 
those of the non-Christian West. As demonstrated in Augustine's view 
of just war, only a Christian worldview can sustain the rule oflaw. 
B. General Zhang Junbo and Colonel Yao Yunzhu 
In their article, "Differences Between Traditional Chinese and 
Western Military Thinking and Their Philosophical Roots," Zhang 
Junbo and Yao Yunzhu identity what they believe are the primary dif-
ferences between Chinese and Western approaches to the use of force 
in international relations.45 In so doing, they have identified the fun-
damental philosophical differences between China and the West and 
the two basic approaches to ethics generally. 
Zhang and Y ao claim that the focus of Chinese decision-making 
regarding the use of force is ')ustice," whereas the focus in the West is 
national "interest." 46 Another way of stating the difference is that for 
the Chinese it is a question of law and morals, whereas for Westerners 
it is a question of policy and expediency. 
It is true that since the nineteenth century, Western discussions re-
garding the use of force have focused on national interest. The formu-
lation and promulgation of the Weinberger Doctrine is an excellent 
example.47 National interest may also have been the focus of decision-
making in the pre-Christian West as the authors claim. However, what 
the authors term the ')ustice" approach appears to be roughly equiva-
lent to just war doctrine, which was predominant in the Christian West 
from the fifth through the eighteenth centuries. 
The authors, while exploring differing approaches to the use of 
force, identity Chinese and Western philosophical and cosmological 
differences that account for those differing approaches. Although they 
45 
46 
47 
Zhang & Yao, supra note 3, at 209-10. 
Id. at209. 
See infra Part III. 
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do not directly address differences in social order, the basic cosmo-
logical differences that they do address have direct implications for the 
type of social order that became dominant in China. 
1. Justice v. Interest 
Zhang and Yao write: "In a very broad sense, Chinese traditional 
military theories place more emphasis on upholding 'justice' while 
Western theories focus on the gaining of 'interests.' This may be best 
demonstrated by the different approaches each takes in thinking and 
explaining the causes as well as the aims of war."48 "Justice" corre-
sponds to law and "interest" to policy. Zhang and Y ao portray the de-
cision to go to war as being made on one basis or the other.49 They cite 
historical examples from Chinese literature in which war is waged to 
"punish the immoral," "uphold the ethical codes, that is, courtesy, jus-
tice, loyalty and commitment," and "for 'the purpose of stopping tyr-
anny and getting rid of a dictator. "'50 
Most of Zhang and Y ao' s illustrations of the Western approach to 
war are drawn from Greek authors. It is unclear whether their defmi-
tion of "West" includes the Christian era from the fifth through the 
eighteenth centuries. It was during that period that Augustine formu-
lated and Christendom developed just war doctrine. 5 1 The classic trea-
tises on international law adopted just war doctrine whole cloth. 
If Zhang and Y ao mean to include the Christian West in their use 
of the term "West," their assertion that the West tends to approach war 
on the basis of interest must be modified. Granted, it may be that even 
those in the West who profess or claim to act on the basis of 'justice" 
rather than "interest" really act on the basis of interest alone. Zhang 
and Y ao acknowledge the same phenomenon in Chinese history-the 
claim of justice is often a pretense for interest. 52 Even if the Christian 
!d. 
48 
49 
Zhang & Yao, supra note 3, at 210. 
!d. at 211. 
By and large, the ancient Chinese held disputes over moral issues as the 
most important factor in causing war while ancient Greeks and Romans 
stuck to interest conflicts when explaining the war ferment. ... [O]ne can 
hardly find any assertions in the huge number of Chinese history books stat-
ing that material gains were legitimate aims of war .... [W]hat one con-
stantly comes across in those books is the condemnation of such assertions. 
50 !d. (citation omitted). 
51 JOHN MARK MATTOX, SAINT AUGUSTINE AND THE THEORY OF JUST WAR 1-
2 (2006). 
52 Zhang & Yao, supra note 3, at 211. 
2008] CHINESE AND WESTERN WORLD VIEWS 105 
West has acted on the basis of interest in some cases, Zhang and Y ao 
fail to acknowledge that these actions were contrary to the West's 
moral and legal position. 
2. Inward Focus on the One v. Outward Focus on the One 
Zhang and Y ao correctly assert that the modem, non-Christian 
West focuses on interest rather than justice. However, they fail to rec-
ognize the essential unity of Chinese and non-Christian Western cos-
mology and social order, a unity more fundamental than the points of 
difference. The differences that do arise between Chinese and post-
Christian thought in the West are due in part to the limited success of 
the modem West in its effort to rid itself of the Christian worldview. 
Neither Chinese philosophy nor non-Christian Western philosophy can 
provide the foundation for operating on the basis of justice rather than 
interest because they reject the belief in a created order distinct from 
God. 
Zhang and Y ao describe what they believe are the fundamental 
philosophical differences between China and the West from which the 
differing approaches to war rise. But the Chinese and non-Christian 
Western differences in cosmology are not as essential as the similari-
ties. The authors provide a summary of the basic Chinese view of real-
ity, or "cosmology": 
A central task of ancient ethical philosophy in China is to 
inspire people to cultivate the good in their nature and to dis-
card the evil. It holds that the "heavenly laws" (tiandao) which 
refers to the natural law or even more broadly to the objective 
universe, is fundamentally in conformity with "inner life" (nei-
zai xingming) which means human nature .... By looking in-
trospectively into his own mind, he can gain a better knowl-
edge of the heavenly laws. And by constantly cultivating and 
improving himself, he can compromise with nature and reach 
the ultimate harmony [of the human nature and heavenly 
laws].53 
In this basically pantheistic cosmology, there is no essential differ-
ence between man and the rest of reality, and man looks inward to 
discover what is around him. The authors contrast the Chinese ethical 
philosophy, which inspires people to look inward, with what they be-
53 Id at 216. 
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lieve is traditional Western philosophy. Westerners, they believe, ap-
proach natnre in a very objective manner failing to view man and na-
ture as an organic whole. 54 
Even assuming the general validity of the distinctions that Zhang 
and Yao draw, it is important to ask if there is something much more 
basic that Chinese philosophy shares with non-Christian Western phi-
losophy than the differences they note. It may be true that Chinese 
philosophy generally looks inward and views the universe as a whole, 
but this is not wholly unlike many major schools of Western philoso-
phy and theology that have an inward focus and view all reality as es-
sentially one. The Realist schools of Western philosophy, both ancient 
and modem, have viewed universals, as opposed to particulars, as ul-
timate. 55 Like the ancient Greeks, most Western philosophers since 
Descartes, including Kant and his offspring, have had an inward and 
subjective focus. Kant also had a major influence on modem theology. 
That influence includes, most notably, the theology of Schleiermacher 
(Protestant liberalism), Karl Barth (Protestant neo-orthodoxy), and 
several modem Roman Catholic theologians who are closer ideologi-
cally to Eastern philosophy than to orthodox Christianity. 56 
Both Chinese and non-Christian Western cosmology view all be-
ing as one. 57 There is no Creator-creature distinction as there is in 
Id 
54 Id 
Western philosophers have followed a different path studying the rela-
tionship between man and nature. Their understanding of nature is more 
scientific and materialistic .... Instead of focusing on the inner world, they 
seek answers from solid facts in the outer world .... Unlike ancient Chi-
nese who have looked upon man and the universe as an organic whole, an-
cient Westerners treated them as two distinctive systems. They tended to 
approach nature in a very objective manner, explaining it as it is and using 
it to their own benefit. 
55 See 9 THE NEW ENCYCLOPlEDIA BRITANNICA 974 (15th ed. 1994). 
56 See VAN TIL, supra note 21, for a thorough and incisive treatment of an-
cient Greek and European philosophers and their legacy, which resides in modern 
Protestant and Roman Catholic theologians. He summarizes: "Protestantism has in 
effect returned to the bosom of the mother church even as the theologians of the 
church have in effect marched forward with the theologians of neo-Protestantism 
toward an alliance with modern subjective philosophy." Jd at 223. 
57 Compare FRANCIS A. SCHAEFFER, A CHRISTIAN MANIFESTO 24 (1981) 
("The term humanism ... means Man beginning with himself, with no knowledge 
except what he himself can discover and no standards outside of himself. In this 
view Man is the measure of all things, as the Eulightemnent expressed it.") and 
CHARLES MORRIS, THE PRAGMATIC MOVEMENT IN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY 7 (1970) 
("The major pragmatists all accepted the view that man emerged as one kind of liv-
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Christian thought. Both Chinese and non-Christian Western thought 
presuppose a basic cosmological monism. Whether man starts by 
studying himself or the world surrounding him, and whether he does 
so for the purpose of conforming to the world or manipulating it, man 
ultimately is the only interpreter of the world, and ultimately interprets 
it only for his own benefit. Man, then, is the interpreter of reality, and 
his own interest is his only end. He has no ability to transcend his 
situation and make moral judgments. Nothing exists for him besides 
nature, with which he is essentially one. 
3. Ambiguity v. Precision 
One of the problems with Chinese philosophy is that its basic cos-
mological monism carries over into ethics. Chinese ethics are much 
less rule-oriented than Western ethics. Language need not be precise 
because ethics are based on relationship, not rules. Such concepts as 
ying and yang further break down conceptual and moral distinctions. 
Although Zhang and Y ao do not directly address the issue of social 
order, they show how Chinese philosophy and its equivocal concepts 
work to obliterate distinctions between social groups. 
[The Chinese] way of thinking tends to be ambiguous and 
equivocal in defming concepts and establishing categories. 
However, it is just the ambiguity and equivocality that make 
philosophical concepts flexible and all-inclusive .... For ex-
ample, ying and yang (the negative and the positive) are two 
opposing philosophical concepts which might be contradictory, 
complementary, interchangeable and so on .... Further, ying 
can transform into yang and yang into ying . ... In short, the 
all-inclusive ying and yang may be presented as a series of re-
lationships between orthodox and unorthodox (qi and zheng), 
toughness and softness (gang and rou), superiority and inferi-
ority (qiang and rag), offensive and defensive wong and shou), 
emptiness and fullness (xiu and shi) and so on. 5 
ing being within a long evolutionary process.") with MINTA C. WANG, THE 
ESSENTIALS OF CHINESE THOUGHT: PAST AND PRESENT 36 {1983) ("Tao is 'the 
source of creation' or the source of all beings. It existed before the universe and gave 
birth to all things that constitute the universe .... The goal of the Taoist is 'to be one 
with the Tao,' to be in harmony with the order of nature."). 
58 Zhang & Yao, supra note 3, at 220. 
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Zhang and Yao argue that, in contrast to the ambiguity that exists 
in the Chinese way of thinking, Westerners focus on definitions and 
analysis59 Zhang and Y ao view Chinese ambiguity or lack of preci-
sion as a strength in waging war because it provides flexibility and 
facilitates deception. 60 In actuality, it creates more problems than it 
solves. If ying and yang_is the basic dynamic in the universe, it is im-
possible to make ethical judgments between right and wrong. The au-
thors are thus unable to make any moral judgment about Western val-
ues and behavior. The distinction between ')ustice" and "interest" 
would become meaningless since even opposites become identical. If 
true, the ying-yang dynamic would remove the ability to carry on any 
meaningful dialogue since people could never be sure that anything 
they identified by language would remain the same. 
Lastly, any basis for trust, even among friends or apparent friends, 
would be lost. With ying and yang as essential principles, one has no 
way of differentiating between the treatment due friend and foe, as-
suming people could distinguish friend from foe. A basic cosmological 
monism leads to sociological monism, eliminating the distinction be-
tween society and the state, the multiplicity of groups, and ultimately, 
the individual. If people attained harmony with the heavenly principle, 
they would have no need for social distinctions. If people's interests 
were perceived as the same, they would have no need for multiple 
groups or for a distinction between law and policy. 
Zhang and Y ao are mistaken in their assessment that China and the 
West have fundamental philosophical differences. At the most basic 
level, China and the non-Christian West are fundamentally alike. Their 
worldviews leave no alternative to an ethics of war based on anything 
other than interest. 
C. Professor Shi Yinhong 
Where General Zhang and Colonel Yao focus on differences be-
tween Chinese and Western philosophical thought, Professor Shi iden-
tifies what he believes are points of similarity in worldview. 61 At the 
same time, he notes great diversity in particular ethical norms. He il-
59 Id. ("The West adopts the methods of abstract logical analysis and system-
atic deduction in its philosophical thinking. In their thinking process, Western phi-
losophers try to define every concept, category and proposition precisely and explic-
itly. Every hypothesis has to be exactly defined, logically analyzed and convincingly 
proved."). 
6o Id. 
61 Shi, supra note 4, at 70-71. 
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lustrates those differences with examples arising in Chinese-Western 
relations, particularly since 1949.62 His article focuses on the task of 
formulating common ethical principles upon which China and the 
West may agree for purposes of military intervention, and in so doing 
he raises critical issues regarding social ordering. 
Shi believes that a similarity exists in the Chinese principle of 
"heavenly principles" and the Western notion of "law of nature. "63 He 
also finds similarity in the Chinese ideal of "universal empire" and the 
Western medieval belief in the universal church. The first similarity 
relates to cosmology, while the second similarity relates to social or-
der. 
1. Heavenly Kingdom and the Law of Nature 
The similarity that Professor Shi fmds between the Chinese princi-
ple of "heavenly kingdom" and the Western notion of "law of nature" 
is rooted in a universal human nature. 64 But he gives no indication that 
human nature is fundamentally distinct from God the Creator or any-
thing else in the created order. 
Therefore, on the one hand, most or even all nations or civili-
zations in the world share certain fundamental ethical beliefs, 
expressed by such terms as the traditional Chinese "tian-li" 
(heavenly principles) and the Western "law of nature." On the 
other hand, civilizations have important differences in various, 
more concrete ethical norms, moral practices, and ways of 
normative judgments; they indicate a very rich ethical diver-
sity.65 
62 
63 
64 
Id.at 71-72, 80-84. 
Id.at 70. 
Id.at 70. 
Ethical tradition is probably the most characteristic aspect in the cultural 
tradition of a nation or a civilization. Similarly, moral norms are probably 
the most meaningful notions regarding social arrangements and human be-
havior. Those ethical beliefs not only indicate the ideal, passion, rationality, 
and even the impulse for interests which exist in human nature (and there-
fore exist as well in the particular nature of any individual as a member of 
any nation or civilization), but they also reflect the various kinds of basic 
objective elements which determine their living enviromnent and conditions 
for thinking. 
Id (citations omitted). 
65 Id. at 70 (citations omitted). 
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Professor Shi 's identification of "tian-lz"' (heavenly principle) with 
the West's "law of nature" minimizes essential differences between 
the two. 
It is necessary to distinguish between the use of the term "law of 
nature" before and after the European Enlightemnent. Prior to, and 
even during the Enlightemnent, "law of nature" was a term used in 
orthodox Christian legal and political theory in the West to denote the 
sum total of laws imposed by God the Creator on man and the rest of 
the created order. 66 Christian theology, and corresponding legal and 
political philosophy, clearly distinguished between Creator and crea-
ture, maintaining a fundamental cosmological dualism in the uni-
verse.67 
Although Enlightemnent Deism did not jettison God, it began to 
treat the law of nature as independent of him. With the ascendancy of 
naturalistic materialism, "natural law" became further divorced from 
the God of Enlightemnent Deism to the point of dispensing with the 
personal God as known in Christianity. 68 The "law of nature" as used 
in the Darwinian sense became very similar to the Chinese "heavenly 
principle," both presupposing a fundamental cosmological monism .. 
Law is thus simply something that inheres in being, and, lacking the 
Creator-creature distinction, all being is one. The East and non-
Christian West meet in their agreement regarding the fundamental na-
ture of the universe. 
2. Universal Empire and Medieval Church 
Shi addresses, although briefly, the issue of social order. In so do-
ing, he suggests that the Chinese ideal of universal kingdom is ani-
!d. 
66 See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARJES *39-40. 
67 CORNELIUS VAN TIL, PAUL AT ATIJENS 5 (1978). 
Basic to all the thinking of the Greeks was the assumption that all be-
ing is at bottom one, that all change comes by way of some form of emana-
tion from that one being and is therefore ultimate as the One, and that 
somehow all the ultimate multiplicity that exists as due to ultimate change 
again ultimately returns to the One .... 
But Paul knew that on the contrary, all men at bottom know God, the 
Creator. All men know that they are creatures of God, that they are law 
breakers. At bottom they know that their own systems, according to which 
God cannot exist, are rationalizations by means of which they seek to sup-
press the fact of their responsibility as creatures of God. 
68 UNGER, supra note 5, at 92. 
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mated by the same spirit as the ideal of universal Christendom and 
even Western liberal intemationalism.69 
The nature of the similarity between the Chinese universal empire 
and medieval Christendom that Shi describes is vague. Shi recognizes 
that a distinction should be made between the Christian West (the 
Christendom of medieval Europe) and the non-Christian West (West-
em liberal intemationalism).70 In fact, the difference is great. The 
Christian vision of universal kingdom includes a multiplicity of inde-
pendent nations. Universality does not mean a single centralized po-
litical authority, nor should it be equated with the universal church. 
The church is only one of several institutions within universal Chris-
tendom (along with the family and the state), with each institution un-
der God and law.71 China and the non-Christian West view universal 
order as an all-encompassing centralized political entity, ruling, of 
course, with benevolence.72 The post-Christian West's visions of unity 
are universal in scope and political in nature, eliminating jurisdictional 
distinctions. That is a totally different vision of universality from that 
held in Christian orthodoxy. 
3. Justice or Interest 
Shi recognizes custom (/i) as deriving from a basic harmony of na-
ture and man, which men realize by looking inward.73 That was central 
to the Confucian vision of society. In contrast, the Chinese Legalist 
School had a different vision of legal order, one based on power, cor-
responding to the positivist view of law (Shi calls it "liberal") that 
!d. 
69 Shi, supra note 4, at 71. 
In the field of international affairs, we see on the Chinese side the tradi-
tional ethics of "Hua-xia zhi jiao" (Chinese universal precepts), "wang-dao'' 
(kingly way), and "li-jiao" (indoctrination of proper manners), which are 
probably the same in spirit as the ethics of medieval Enropean Christen-
dom, and to a certain degree, the Western liberal internationalism of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries.:. 
70 ld. at 71. 
71 See 2 CALVIN: INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 1211-22 (John T. 
McNeill ed., Ford Lewis Battles trans., Westroinster Press 1960) (1559) (discussing 
the chnrch's limited jurisdiction); Id. at 1485-90 (discussing God's appointroent of 
civil government); see a/so AL1MAN K. SWIHART, LUTHER AND THE LUTHERAN 
CHURCH: 1483-1960, at 153-59 (1960) (discussing the high estate of marriage and 
family). 
72 See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 54-55 (Garrett Ward Sheldon 
ed., 2001). 
73 Shi, supra note 4, at 70-73. 
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arose in the West in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 74 Legal 
positivism began its rise to predominance in the West during the nine-
teenth century.75 Austin defmed law as the command of the political 
sovereign. 76 Because there is no international political sovereign, there 
can logically be no such thing as international law. Relations between 
states will thus be governed purely by politics. Military force is per-
haps the ultimate political instrument. Therefore, post-Christian West-
em nations developed a legal-political worldview that justified impos-
ing their will on less developed nations with no limitations other than 
national interest. Shi recognizes the role of power politics in China 
originating in the Legalist School in the Age of the Warring States. At 
the same time, Shi emphasizes that China has historically suffered at 
the hands of Western powers pursuing policies based on interest that 
conflicted with just war ideology. He states that Chinese behavior be-
ginning with Mao's ascendancy to power can be understood only in 
light of the effects on China and other nations of the lack of legal re-
straint on Western intervention in the affairs of developing nations. 77 
Despite these historical abuses against China, Shi would like to find 
some justification for limited intervention in the modem world upon 
which China and other great powers can agree. 
Shi recognizes that positivism applied to international relations is a 
departure from the Christian Western view of law. Classical interna-
tional law, reflecting the Christian West's legal tradition, did not rec-
ognize the right of armed intervention in foreign states and did recog-
74 
75 
(1998). 
!d. at 71. 
ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM Thl AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 2 
76 AUSTThl, supra note 15, at 11, 13. 
77 Shi, supra note 4, at 71. 
At the same time, however, Chinese history also contains an ethics of 
power politics which originated from the Legalist School in the age of War-
ring States. These ethics are similar in basic tenets, ways of thinking, and 
emotional appeals to the realist ethics described or advocated by Thucy-
dides, Machiavelli, and even Hans Morgenthau and Henry Kissinger. In 
contemporary China, what most strongly influenced, or even dominated, the 
international behavior of China in the three decades after 1949 was the in-
ternational ethics of the Chinese Communists in Chairman Mao's genera-
tion. Contemporary China, which originated from modern Chinese national-
ism, was indignant from endless humiliations suffered in modern times, de-
spite being a great ancient civilization, and from Marxism. 
!d. (citations omitted). 
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nize the equality of all states?8 The principles of non-intervention and 
equality of states have been adopted in part by international organiza-
tions/9 but the United Nations Charter scheme compromises these 
principles because certain powerful countries, most notably the per-
manent members of the Security Council, have potentially expansive 
powers of military intervention. 
On the other hand, Shi notes that Western powers have often oper-
ated solely on the basis of national interest while claiming compliance 
with internationallaw.80 Shi discusses the West's failure to abide by 
its own just war tradition based on natural law. 81 He does not note, 
however, that the West's failure to abide by just war tradition relates 
to a basic shift in jurisprudence that took place as England and the 
United States moved from a Blackstonian view of law to the utilitarian 
view championed by Bentham and Austin. The Blackstonian view of 
78 BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1146-48 
(3rd ed. 1999). 
Id 
Id 
79 Shi, supra note 4, at 76. 
[T]he principle of the equality of states, whether powerful or weak (with its 
related ban on the great power intervention), seem much more in accord 
with the modern ethical traditions of the West. These principles can be said 
to originate from the ancient and powerful notion of natural law, which 
constitutes one of the core norms of modern international law and ethics. 
These ethics were molded and spread all over the world by the West and 
were embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of 
the United Nations, which were wholly or largely drafted by Westerners 
(especially the British and Americans). 
80 
81 
!d. at 76-77. 
!d. at 76-77. 
However, since the Vienna Congress in the early nineteenth century, the 
great Western powers have also formally and repeatedly set up great power 
privileges and have made these privileges legitimate through international 
law. They rely on their superior power and justifY their actions by their par-
ticular roles in the international society. In international political practices, 
the Western powers have frequently bullied, humiliated, and intervened 
against the weak states and nations in the name of loose and ambiguous 
wgreat powers' responsibilities." For example, Theodore Roosevelt's re-
sponsibilities of "international police" and also "world leadership" have 
been asserted by every U.S. President since the end of World War II. How-
ever, neither the great powers' formal privileges nor those rights derived 
from their self-granted responsibilities have any legitimacy in the sense of 
morality. Further, those actions are not in accord with the most fundamental 
ethical traditions of the West itself unless one unreasonably regards the 
"might is right" logic declared by the Athenian generals at Melos as such a 
tradition. 
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law, in both its domestic and international applications, was based 
upon the Christian view of law given by God, the Creator, who is dis-
tinct from His creation. 82 
In the nineteenth century, Darwinian evolution declared the death 
of Christian cosmology and its distinction between the Creator and the 
creature. At the same time, legal positivism spelled the death of the 
rule of law based upon neutral principles that had their origin outside 
human political power.83 The United Nations is not an outgrowth of 
the medieval notion of a universal church. It is a vision of very differ-
ent origin arising out of the death of rule of law and the demise of a 
God distinct from His creation. 
Like Zhang and Yao, Shi notes quite candidly thatChina has often 
acted on the basis of interest in the same manner as the West. 84 The 
main problem with Shi's analysis is that, although he recognizes that 
China and the West have numerous particular conflicting ethical 
norms, he indicates that they share fundamental views about the cre-
ated order, society, and the nature of law. He realizes that China and 
the West must come to a consensus on particulars, and has even de-
vised a set of ethical criteria to employ in resolving intervention is-
sues. Unless he establishes a satisfactory ground for deriving particular 
ethical standards, however, his approach will also dissolve into little 
more than shared political interests. 
D. Professor Roberto Mangabeira Unger 
In Law in Modern Society, Professor Roberto M. Unger compares 
and contrasts several non-Western legal systems, including the tradi-
!d. 
82 BLACKSTONE, supra note 31, *39, *41. 
Man, considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to the laws 
of his creator, for he is an entirely dependent being. 
This law of nature, being co-eval [existing at the same time] with man-
kind and dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to any 
other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times: no 
human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this: and such of them as are 
valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immedi-
ately, from this original. 
83 Leslie Green, Legal Positivism, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2003), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/en-
tries!legal-positivism/. 
84 Shi, supra note 4, at 71,73-76. 
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tiona! Chinese, with the Western legal order. 85 He believes that a nec-
essary relationship exists between ideology, social order, and particu-
lar concepts of law. 86 Ideology includes religious belief and issues ad-
dressed above as cosmology. Unger's analysis is particularly compel-
ling, in part, because his book is not an apology for the religion, social 
order, or concept of law that characterizes what he calls Western "lib-
eral society."87 
A major purpose of Unger's study analyzing the differences be-
tween Western and non-Western legal systems is to explain why "legal 
order" arose only in the West. Professor Unger uses the term "legal 
order" in a way that is roughly synonymous with "rule of law" and 
"Western legal tradition." For Unger, a central characteristic of legal 
order is the distinction between law and politics. 
Unger identifies three distinct types of law: customary, bureau-
cratic, and legal order. 88 He distinguishes bureaucratic legal systems 
from customary systems in that bureaucratic law is positive (written 
and not merely based on ~ractice) as well as public (within the prov-
ince of the state to make). 9 China experienced a struggle between par-
ties who wanted to maintain a system based on customary law and 
those who wished to establish a bureaucratic system. In China, the law 
of the customary order is called li, and that of the bureaucratic order is 
called fa. 90 
Legal order has in common with bureaucratic law the features of 
being positive and public. But legal order is characterized by two addi-
tional features that distinguish it from the bureaucratic order-
autonomy (law is distinct from politics in terms of substance, institu-
tions, methodologies, and professions) and generality (law applies uni-
formly and neutrally to all).91 
Unger believes that legal order arose in the West alone for two rea-
sons. First, a cosmology-a religion of transcendence--developed in 
the West that recognized a distinction between God as the Creator and 
His creation. Second, the West's social order has been characterized 
by multiple groups competing for influence and power92 The interplay 
of its particular ideology (which includes its religion) and social order 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
9l 
92 
See UNGER, supra note 5, at 86-126. 
ld at 66-86. 
Id at 166-81. 
!d. at 48-52. 
Id at 50. 
See id at 93, 102. 
!d. at 52-55. 
!d. at 66. 
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resulted in legal order. Unger does not make these connections to 
show that China, or other cultures, are inferior to the West or that 
these cultures should attempt to develop legal order. Rather, his aim is 
to convince the reader that change comes not incrementally but by 
bounds through the synthesis of concurrent changes in ideology and 
social order. 
Unger believes that the ideology of transcendent religion simply 
serves to justify the social order93 That is, with its deceptive claim of 
neutrality, legal order becomes a powerful tool that dominant groups 
use to legitimate their position in society. Belief in the rule of law 
serves to legitimize the exercise of political power. 
1. Inunanence v. Transcendence 
Unger asserts that religion of a transcendent God is a necessary 
condition for the development of legal order.94 China never developed 
a religion of transcendence. China had two competing views of God 
but preferred immanence over transcendence. 
With respect to the image of the supreme deity, the most im-
portant trend was the increasing characterization of divinity as 
T'ien (heaven) rather then Shang Ti (lord-on-high). As a result, 
the notion of deity became more impersonal and naturalistic. 
The wavering of early Chinese religion between the quest for 
transcendence and the commitment to immanence was defini-
tively resolved in favor of the latter. ... [N]either Confucian-
ism or Taoism, nor the later Buddhist theology, allowed a 
marked separation of God and world. Consequently, none of 
the many forms of ancient Chinese religion viewed the world 
as something made by God according to a design that could be 
at least partially apprehended by the human mind.95 
Christianity maintains a clear distinction between the Creator and 
His creation. The Creator reveals certain truths about the world and 
imposes obligations on man. As a consequence, moral judgments 
made in conformity with divine law have a claim to neutrality that 
binds all men. Law is more than the imposition of one group's inter-
93 
94 
95 
!d. 
!d. 
Id. at 99-100. 
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ests on others. Law is justice. Law accords with divine reason and is 
not simply the triumph of human will. 
2. State and Society 
Another necessary condition, in Unger's mind, for the develop-
ment of legal order is a social order based upon group pluralism. 96 In 
China, ecclesiastical and familial institutions, and even the individual, 
were subordinated to, or subsumed in, civil authority. 97 Unger asserts 
that religions of immanence tend to justify the given social order and 
provide no vantage point from which to critique it.98 Change is there-
fore unlikely unless a competing vision of social order is introduced 
from outside. The social order of China exists in marked contrast to 
that of Europe. 
In China, religious learning was put at the service of govern-
ment and most ritual functions were performed by the rulers 
themselves or, in the case of ancestor worship, by the house-
hold heads. 
Whatever the reasons for religious naturalism and for the 
weakness of ecclesiastical bodies in ancient China, the impact 
on polity and law was enormous. It became impossible to de-
velop the view that nature and society are governed by univer-
sallaws of divine making. Another consequence of the Chinese 
religious evolution was the absence of a doctrine and of a pro-
phetic or priestly tradition that might have operated as an effec-
tive check on governmental power. Lastly, the lack of a con-
ception of the relationship between a personal God and the 
unique souls made in His image denied theological support to 
beliefs that could have emphasized the independence of indi-
viduals from one another or from the groups and societies to 
which they belonged. 
. . . [I]n Europe science and political philosophy alike 
started off from the idea of universal principles; government 
had to contend with the conception of God-given natural laws 
and with powerful churches; and religious belief emphasized 
96 
97 
98 
Id. at 66. 
See id. 
!d. at 95. 
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the capacity of individuals to transcend their social circum-
stances just as their Creator transcends His creation. 99 
... Legalists [in their struggle with the Confucianists] on 
the contrary, wanted nothing more than to extend the powers of 
govermnent. ... Consequently, traditional bodies like the ex-
tended family, the village, or the guild should be stripped of 
most of their powers, their tendency to develop centers of au-
thority checked, and all men equalized by the fear of the ruler 
and his agents. The imposed order of the state would replace an 
imaginary natural order of society. 100 
The Christian West developed distinct institutions of family, 
church, and state. 101 It eventually developed a social order in which 
none of those institutions was preeminent except within its allocated 
sphere or jurisdiction. In early Germanic Christian culture, the family 
had certain preeminence over the civil and ecclesiastical order. 102 The 
church was eventually able to assert its independence from the family 
and the civil order. Unfortunately, the church attempted to bring the 
family and state into a subordinate or dependent relationship with the 
church. In large measure, control over the family was effected through 
the doctrine of marriage as a sacrament. 103 Through Gregory VII's 
Dictatus Papae, the eleventh century church claimed the power to de-
pose civil rulers. 104 An eventual compromise between church and state 
ensured the independence of the church. In the post-Christian era, just 
as in the pre-Christian era and in Chinese society, it is the state that 
asserts its supremacy over, or even subsumes, all other social groups. 
3. Justice and Interest 
The Confucianists and Legalists fought for dominance in China. 105 
Though they offered competing visions of law and society, in some 
99 
100 
!d. at 100-0 I. 
Id. at 107-08. 
101 10 See BERMAN, supra note , at I. 
102 ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 422-45, 462-476; BERMAN, supra note 10, at 
52, 61, 82. 
1m 4 ZIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 76-95; JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT 
TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE WESTERN TRADITION 16-41 
(DonS. Browning & Ian S. Evison eds., 1997). 
104 BERMAN, supra note 10, at 95-99. 
105 UNGER, supra note 5, at I 06. 
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sense they faced the same predicament-that of being unable to le-
gitimize their respective visions. Lacking a religion of transcendence, 
Legalists were never able to justify their bureaucratic laws as some-
thing other than the will of the strongest. 106 The Confucianist view of 
society was based on generally accepted custom. As the Chinese peo-
ple increasingly came into contact with other cultures they realized 
that social customs are established in large measure by convention and 
not the natural order of things. With this growing realization and in-
creasing disintegration of consensus they were quite vulnerable be-
cause they had no religion of transcendence to provide a means of 
ideological legitimization of existing custom.107 
Unger argues that "Western liberal society's" distinguishing trait is 
its coincidence of transcendental religion and group pluralism giving 
rise to legal order. 108 Unfortunately, he believes that the religion of 
!d. 
106 Id. at 102-03. 
Above all, governments struggled to bring an ever broader range of social 
activities under their control and guidance; to politicize what had previously 
been accepted as part of the self-regulating order of society. 
[T]he fa [bureaucratic-type laws] were positive; they were made rules. The 
tendency to write them down and publicize them calls attention to the more 
basic premise that the laws arise from the human will rather than from a 
pattern underlying the reciprocities of social life. The need for positive law 
was a byproduct of the process described earlier as the disintegration of 
community. In a setting of rapid dissolution of the established rank system 
and of the shared values and insights with which that system was bound up, 
it became increasingly more difficult to rely on custom. 
107 Id.at 108. 
Thus, the Confucianists accepted and reinterpreted the li [customary stan-
dards of conduct] of the feudal age as the way to resolve the conflicts 
among and within individuals that had become rife during the transforma-
tion period. They argued that the fa, as coercively imposed positive rules, 
affected the symptoms rather than the causes of social ills. Because they 
disregarded the true basis of social harmony, such rules could lead only to 
greater dissension. 
Id. Berman notes that it was Christianity as developed in the West that "broke the 
fiction of the immutability of the [Gerrnauic] folklaw." He further notes: 
Gradually, between the sixth and the eleventh centuries, Germanic law, 
with its overwhelming biases of sex, class, race, and age, was affected by 
the Christian doctrine of the fundamental equality of all persons before 
God: woman and man, slave and free, poor and rich, child and adult. These 
beliefs had an ameliorating effect on the position of women and slaves and 
on the protection of the poor and helpless. 
BERMAN, supra note 10, at 65. 
108 UNGER, supra note 5, at 66. 
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transcendence is a myth used to legitimize a social order based on 
domination by the most powerful. The solution to social problems, he 
deduces, does not lie in perfection of the given system of laws, much 
less in preaching of the gospel with its consequent regeneration of in-
dividuals and establishment of Christian institutions. 
For Unger, the God of Augustinian Christianity does not exist, or 
at least has not spoken; thus, a value-neutral legal order is not possible. 
All "law" is merely the imposition of interest; in fact, law cannot exist. 
All is politics; therefore, man must quit playing law and play better 
politics. The difficulty for Unger is that, in order for political decisions 
to have legitimacy, the decisions must be equally in everyone's best 
interest. In short, the world must operate on a principle of global una-
nimity. 
PART III- JUST WAR DOCTRJNE109 
A. Introduction 
The distinction and relationship between law and policy is seldom 
more consequential than in making decisions to go to war. Just war 
doctrine identifies two basic types of judgment that must be made be-
fore going to war. no The first type is legal in nature, and the second 
type is prudential.ll 1 To use the terminology of Zhang and Yao, there 
is a ')ustice" component and an "interest" component. Classical inter-
national law treatises adopted the elements of Christian just war doc-
trine and maintained the distinction between the legal and the pruden-
tial elements. 
Even when customary international law became severed from its 
overtly biblical and theological moorings, it nevertheless maintained 
the concept of just cause that is the central element of just war doc-
trine. Because classical, customary international law remained firmly 
established in the pre-Enlightenment "natural law" school of jurispru-
dence, lawyers never viewed the law as simply a matter of human 
convention. Properly understood, customary international law reflects 
the immutable law of nature, which is the law of God. 112 For that rea-
109 Jeffrey C. Tuomala, Just Cause: The Thread That Runs So True, 13 DICK. J. 
lNT'L L. I (1994). Part III of the present article is taken in large measure from that 
article. However, that article focuses equally on customary international law, the 
U.N. Charter scheme, and the U.S. Constitution. 
IIO WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN, THE CONOUCTOF JUST AND LIMITED WAR27 (1981). 
111 !d. 
112 VA TIEL, supra note 17, at !viii. 
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son, the Western notion of customary international law must be distin-
guished from the Chinese notion of customary law (li). Similarly, the 
relationship that policy bears to law in the Christian West distin-
guishes policy judgments from Chinese bureaucratic law (fa). 
The fact that a nation has just cause, however, does not mean that 
it should wage war. The decision to wage war entails both a legal 
judgment that just cause exists, and a prudential or policy judgment 
that war is in the national interest. A prudential judgment is founded 
largely on utility. Not only must the state have a legal right, it must be 
advisable and expedient to exercise that right. It would be contrary to 
just war doctrine and, therefore, immoral to wage a war contrary to 
national interest even if just cause exists. Emerich de Vattel, the 
premier eighteenth century international law jurist, described the dis-
tinction between law and policy: 
The reasons which may [cause] [states] to [wage war] are of 
two classes. Those of the one class shew [sic] that [a state] has 
a right to make war,-that [a state] has just grounds for under-
taking it: -these are called justificatory reasons [legal judg-
ments]. The others, founded on fitness and utility, determine 
whether it be expedient for the sovereign to undertake a war, 
-these are called motives [prudential judgments ].113 
Classic just war doctrine developed over the course of a thousand 
years, beginning with Augustine and cuhninating with the Spanish 
theologian and lawyer, Franciscus De Victoria. 114 Augustine addressed 
all of the basic issues and set the framework for discussion that con-
tinues to this day. Theologians, knights, canon lawyers, and civil law-
yers worked within that framework developing details and making 
applications.ll5 Occasionally, they made significant departures from it, 
most notably in the practice of holy war. The elements of just war are 
just cause, right authority, right intention, proportionali?; of ends, last 
resort, reasonable hope of success, and the aim of peace. 16 
113 Id. at 301 (emphasis in original). 
114 I 0 Tuoma a, supra note 1 9, at 48. 
115 See generally FREDERICK H. RUSSELL, THE JUST WAR IN THE MIDDLE 
AGES (1975) (outlining the development of early just war theory); JAMES TURNER 
JOHNSON, IDEOLOGY, REASON, AND THE LIMITATION OF WAR: RELIGIOUS AND 
SECULAR CONCEPTS 1200-1740, at 26-80 (1975) (explaining late medieval just war 
theory). 
116 James Turner Johnson, Just War Thinking and its Contemporary Applica-
tion: The Moral Significance of the Weinberger Doctrine, in THE RECOURSE To 
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Some scholars have asserted that former Secretary of Defense 
Caspar Weinberger's criteria117 for the employment of U.S. combat 
forces overseas are basically those of just war doctrine. 118 They claim 
that the Weinberger criteria correspond directly to the just war criteria 
as follows: 
Just War Weinberger Doctrine 
1. Just cause 1. Vital to national interests 
2. Right authority 2. Support of American people 
and their elected representa-
tives 
3. Proportionality of ends 3. Continual assessment of ob-
jectives and forces committed 
4. Reasonable hope of success 4. Clear intention of winning 
5. Last resort 5. Last resort 
6. Right intention 6. Clearly defmed political and 
7. End of peace 7. 
military objectives 
(Implied in 1 and 5) 119 
While elements of just war doctrine and the Weinberger Doctrine 
appear to be similar, there is a fundamental dissimilarity between the 
two doctrines that looms far larger than any similarities. The Weinber-
ger Doctrine is a compendium of only prudential or policy considera-
tions. 
From the U.S. Department of Defense's perspective, the Weinber-
ger criteria provide some very important prudential guidelines for the 
use of force, and, in that sense, they are limiting factors. 120 However, 
if the Weinberger Doctrine was meant to be a comprehensive list of 
criteria for the national decision to use force, it is severely wanting. 
The central role that the Weinberger Doctrine has played in U.S. for-
eign policy certainly bolsters General Zhang's and Colonel Yao's as-
WAR: AN APPRAISAL OF THE WEINBERGER DOCTRINE 81,87 (Alan Ned Sabrosky & 
Robert L. Sloane eds., 1988) [hereinafter Just War Thinking]. 
m Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense, Remarks to the National 
Press Club: The Uses of Military Power (November 28, 1984), in CASPAR W. 
WEINBERGER, FIGHTING FOR PEACE: SEVEN CRITICAL YEARS IN THE PENTAGON 
433, 441-43 (1990). The six criteria listed in his remarks have become known as the 
Weinberger Doctrine. 
118 Just War Thinking, supra note 116, at 86. 
119 Id. at 100-01. 
120 Weinberger, supra note 117, at441-43. 
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section that decisions to use force in the West are based on "interest" 
rather than ')ustice." 
B. Elements of Just War 
1. Just Cause 
The Classic Formulation of Just Cause. Augustine is considered 
the foremost expositor of just war doctrine, although he did not de-
scribe it systematically at any one place in his writings. He wrote that 
wars to avenge injuries are just. 121 Later writers described with more 
specificity what it means to avenge injuries. Gratian's A Concordance 
of Discordant Canons (1140), 122 the first and perhaps greatest system-
atic compilation and treatment of canon law, held that nations may use 
force to defend themselves, to exact compensation, and to punish.123 
These same bases were accepted by the civil lawyers of Medieval 
Europe. 124 In fact, civil authority's very reason for being is to serve as 
God's agent of justice, punishing criminals and exacting compensation 
for injuries. 125 Sanctions are based on the existence of fault, and war is 
seen as an extraordinary form of lawsuit to vindicate justice.126 The 
underlying wrongs and remedies available are closely analogous to 
those in a domestic legal system. This threefold purpose for the use of 
force is perfectly reflected in the international law treatises of Vattel 
and Grotius. 
121 AUGUSTINE, supra note 38, at 515. See also RUSSELL, supra note 115, at 
18. 
122 BERMAN, supra note 10, at 14347. 
123 See RUSSELL, supra note 115, at 60-68. Thomas Aquinas quotes Augustine 
as authority for defining just cause: "A just war is usually described as one that 
avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to make 
amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized un-
justly." THOMAS AQUINAS, II THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 578 (Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province trans., Encyc1opredia Britannica, Inc. ed., 1952). 
124 See RUSSELL, supra note 115, at 137-38. In medieval times, civil author-
ity's very existence was to serve as God's agent of justice punishing criminals and 
exacting compensation for injuries. Thus, canon lawyers, theologians, and civil law-
yers all shared the same perspective, namely that their authority was derived from 
God and the Bible. See, e.g., Romans 13:4 (NN) ("For he [the civil ruler] is God's 
servant to do you good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the 
sword for nothing. He is God's servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the 
wrongdoer."). 
125 Romans 13:14. 
126 MATTOX, supra note 51, at 46. 
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In assessing just causes for going to war, the classic legal scholars 
determined that the legal cause of every just war is an injury done to 
one nation by another. Because injuries include any unlawful attacks 
or other violations of rights identified by international law, the kinds 
of injury giving rise to just cause are extremely numerous. 127 As a re-
sult, three just and lawful objectives exist for which nations wage war: 
(1) obtaining compensation or reparations for losses; (2) punishing 
offenders by reprisal for wrongs done; and (3) defending against 
unlawful attacks. 128 Nations attain the first two objectives by resorting 
to offensive war and the third by waging defensive war. Following a 
fmding of just cause, nations may lawfully wage offensive war as a 
sanction to exact compensation for injuries and to punish for 
wrongs.129 On the other hand, nations may wage just defensive war 
without such fmdings in the event of an unlawful attack.130 Because 
there is no superior tribunal before which nations may bring charges or 
complaints, they must necessarily be the judges of their own cases. 131 
Holy War Distortion of Just Cause. During the medieval period, 
some nations attempted to expand the bases of just cause to include 
waging holy war. They justified holy war on the sole basis that others 
did not share the same religious beliefs. Religious differences, even in 
the absence of other wrongs, were treated as just cause for war. 132 The 
goals of conquest and conversion thus became lawful. This theory was 
used in part to justify the Carolingian conquest of Europe and the me-
dieval Crusades in the Middle East.133 However, Pope Innocent IV and 
the canon lawyer, Hostiensis, denied the right to make war on Mus-
lims or other pagans merely because they were unbelievers. 134 
Holy war doctrine in Christian theology seems to have been laid to 
rest by Franciscus De Victoria in the sixteenth century. His treatise, 
De Indis et de Jure Belli Relectiones, the first modern treatise on in-
ternational law, rejected the justification of religious differences for 
127 V ATTEL, supra note 17, at 302. 
128 Id. Hugo Grotius listed the same three objectives of just wars: "Justifiable 
causes include defense, the obtaining of tbat which belongs to us or is our due, and 
tbe inflicting of punishment." HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 171 
(Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925) (1646). 
129 MATTOX, supra note 51, at45-47. 
130 VATTEL, supra note 17, at 302. 
131 !d. at 301. 
132 
133 
134 
RUSSELL, supra note 115, at 195. 
I d. 
See id. at 195-212. 
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war against the American Indians. 135 In fact, Victoria argued for the 
Indians' right to fight against Christian nations in self-defense. 136 
The Secular Holy War Distortion. Holy war notions are not unique 
to religious thought. Cicero approved of wars waged to impose the 
ideals of Rome. 137 In the last two centuries, the "secular" counterpart 
to holy war has been war based on ideology. A common theme in most 
of these wars is that conquest is for the good of those who suffer under 
an inferior religious, social, or political order. 
The assumption that law and force can make people good, or free, 
or responsible, or whatever else they are lacking, is false. The same 
rationale that would justify the use of force for establishing democracy 
would justify using force for establishing the whole panoply of human 
rights. If world peace and, therefore, national interest depend on uni-
versal adherence to democracy and practice of human rights, there are 
no just-cause limits left on the decision to make war. 138 The purpose of 
war limited to just cause is to return the wronged party to the status 
quo ante bellum and not to use war as an occasion to establish some 
new social order. Therefore, under traditional international law, the 
right of humanitarian intervention is extremely limited. It allows for 
the rescue of one's own citizens, or perhaps others, from a foreign 
state without its permission. 
135 See generally FRANCISCUS DE VICTORIA, DE INDIS ET DE JURE BELLI 
REFLECTIONES 163-78 (Ernest Nys, ed., John Pawley Bate trans., Carnegie Institute 
ofWashington 1917). 
136 Id at 129-49, 171. 
137 BERNARD T. ADENEY, JUST WAR, POLITICAL REALISM, AND FAITH 24-27 
(1988). 
138 President George H.W. Bush's Ambassador to the Organization for Ameri-
can States defended Operation Just Cause (1989 invasion of Panama), designed to 
topple Manuel Noriega, with a display of that kind of optimism and fervor for war-
fare usually associated with religious ideology: 
There are times in the life of men and of nations when history seems to take 
charge of events and to sweep all obstacles from its chosen path. At such 
moments, history appears to incarnate some great and irresistible principle, 
such as the nation-state in the 17th century, nationalism in the 19th_ century, 
and decolonization in the middle part of this century. 
Today, we are once again living in historic times, a time when a great 
principle is spreading across the world like wild fire. That principle is the 
essence of the democratic form of government. It is an idea which has, in 
this decade, and especially in the historic year-1989-acquired the force of 
historical necessity. 
Luigi R. Einaudi, U.S. Permanent Representative to the O.A.S.H.R., 2d Sess. at 2, 
Doc. No. 127 (1990). 
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President George W. Bush increasingly appealed to a version of 
secular holy war over the course of the war in Iraq. 139 The justification 
offered for the initial invasion and occupation of Iraq-to stop the 
threat of a collusive alliance between al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein 
launching a nuclear attack on the United States-was stated in just war 
terms. Once it became clear that the existence of nuclear weapons and 
an Al-Qaeda-Saddam alliance could probably not be established, the 
justification changed. President Bush began to proclaim that the war is 
about exporting democracy and liberty, the promise being that Bagh-
dad would become something of a Middle Eastern "City Built Upon a 
Hill," insEiring surrounding Islamist nations to become free and de-
mocratic. 40 
The unjust-regime basis of justification for invading Iraq should be 
unhesitatingly rejected. The belief that the hearts and minds of Middle 
Eastern peoples will be won through force of arms and implementation 
of a variety of state sanctioned socio-economic programs and the trag-
edy it portends has a recent historical analogue-Vietnam. 141 In es-
sence, President Bush's justification is the promotion of a messianic 
139 See Joe Klein, The Courage Primary, TIME, June 25, 2007, at 39, 39; Ken-
neth T. Walsh, History's Verdict, U.S. NEW & WORLD REP., Jan. 29,2007, at 28,29-
30 (noting that Bush has characterized the opposition as "evildoers" and spoke of an 
"ideological conflict" in the 2006 State of the Union address). 
140 See George W. Bush, President, U.S., Second Inaugural Address {Jan. 20, 
2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/0l/20050120-
l.html (stating that the U.S. encourages democratic reform in other countries and 
"America will walk at your side"). 
141 Two U.S. Senators who are veterans of the Vietnam War have different 
recollections of the reasons for U.S. involvement in that war. Senator James Webb, 
former Secretary of Navy during the Reagan administration, believes that the war in 
Iraq, not the war in Vietnam, is the first war the U.S. has fought to advance an ideol-
ogy. Senator Webb stated concerning the war in Iraq, "The foreign policy of this 
administration [that of President George W. Bush] has been taken over by people 
who would do something we've never done in our history, and that is to attempt to 
export our ideology at the point of a gnn." Chris Jenkins, Reagan Navy Secretary 
Enters Race to Challenge Sen. Allen, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2005, at B04. Senator 
John Kerry, former Presidential candidate, believes the Vietnam War was also 
fought to promote an ideology. Senator Kerry has said, 
I believe very deeply that it was a noble effort [American involvement in 
the Vietnam War] to begin with. I signed up. I volunteered. I wanted to go 
over there and I wanted to win. It was a noble effort to try to make a coun-
try democratic; to try to carry our principles and values to another part of 
the world. 
Interview by Tim Russert with John Kerry, Senator, U.S., on Meet the Press: Inter-
view with Senator John Kerry (NBC television broadcast May 6, 200 I), available at 
http://hnn.us/articles/3552.html. 
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VISIOn in which America has universal jurisdiction to bring down 
kingdoms and raise up others. In his second inaugural address, Presi-
dent Bush stated, 
Advancing these ideals [human rights and self-government] is 
the mission that created our nation. It is the honorable 
achievement of our fathers. Now it is the urgent requirement of 
our nation's security, and the calling of our time. 
So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support 
the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every 
nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in 
the world. 
Today, America speaks anew to the peoples of the world: 
All who live in tyranny and hopelessness can know: the 
United States will not ignore your oppression, or excuse your 
oppressors. When you stand for your liberty, we will stand 
with you. 
When the Declaration of Independence was first read in 
public and the Liberty Bell was sounded in celebration, a wit-
ness said, "It rang as if it meant something." In our time it 
means something still. America, in this young century, pro-
claims liberty throughout all the world, and to all the inhabi-
tants thereof. Renewed in our strength-tested but not weary-
we are ready for the greatest achievements in the history of 
freedom. 142 
The last paragraph of the second inaugural address contains an al-
lusion to the inscription that appears on the Liberty Bell, "Proclaim 
liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof."143 It is 
a quote from Leviticus which refers to the Year of Jubilee, a time when 
captives were to be set free. 144 President Bush is mistaken: Christ, not 
142 h Bus , supra note 140. 
143 USHistory.org, The Liberty Bell, http://www.ushistory.org/libertybelll 
index.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2007). 
144 Leviticus 25:10 (NIV) ("Consecrate the fiftieth year and proclaim liberty 
throughout the land to all its inhabitants. It shall be a jubilee for you; each one of you 
is to return to his family property and each to his own clan."). Jesus commenced his 
public ministry by reading the prophecy from Isaiah 6 I: I -2 regarding the Year of 
Jubilee. He then claimed that he had that day fulfilled that scripture. 
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Caesar, sets people free. The triune God acts through His people, the 
church, giving them jurisdiction to tear down and raise up kingdoms, 
not through force of arms but through the proclamation of the Gos-
pel.145 When placed on trial before Pontius Pilate, Jesus made it very 
clear that the kingdom He established would not be established by 
military force. 146 The root problem of conflict in the Middle East, as it 
is in every other place in the world, is not political bondage but spiri-
tual bondage. 147 Because it is not a conflict fought against flesh and 
blood, it can be won only by spiritual means entrusted to the church. 148 
The state is neither commissioned nor equipped to deal with that kind 
of enemy. The state's jurisdiction and power are limited. 
The spirit of the Lord is on me, because he has anointed me to preach good 
news to the poor. 
He has sent me to proclaim freedom for the prisoners and recovery for the 
blind, 
To release the oppressed, to proclaim the year of the Lord's favor. 
Luke 4:18-19 (NIV). 
145 Luke I :51-53 (NIV). Mary prophesied regarding Jesus while he still in the 
womb: 
!d. 
He has performed mighty deeds with his arm; 
he has scattered those who are proud in there inmost thoughts. 
He has brought down rulers from their thrones 
but has lifted up the humble. 
He has filled the hungry with good things 
but has sent the rich away empty. 
1
"" John 18:36 (NIV) ("Jesus said, 'My kingdom is not of this world. If it were, 
my servants would fight to prevent my arrest by the Jews. But now my kingdom is 
from another place."'). 
Id 
147 John 8:31-36 (NIV). 
To the Jews who believed him, Jesus said, "If you hold to my teaching, 
you are really my disciples. Then you will know the truth and the truth will 
set you free." 
They answered him, "We are Abraham's descendants and have never 
been slaves of anyone. How can you say that we will be set free?" 
Jesus replied, "I tell you the truth, everyone who sins is a slave to sin. 
Now a slave has no permanent place in the family, but a son belongs to it 
forever. So if the son sets you free, you will be free indeed." 
148 Ephesians 6:12 (NIV) ("For our struggle is not against flesh and blood, but 
against the rulers, against the authorities, against the powers of this dark world and 
against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly realms."). 
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2. Right Authority 
Most classic scholars based international law on the sovereignty of 
nation-states. 149 That basis has been seriously questioned beginning in 
the past century. Vattel took a strong stand that international law in-
cluded preexisting and immutable laws of nature. 150 Although he did 
not argue that the law of nature required multiple nation-states, he cer-
tainly implied it in the title of his treatise: The Law of Nations; or, 
Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of 
Nations and Sovereigns. 151 Thus, under a legal framework as revealed 
in Scripture, it is arguable that the delegation to the United Nations of 
the right to use force is not only unworkable and imprudent, it is 
unlawful as a violation of jus cogen. 152 
The United Nations Charter (U.N. Charter) scheme assumes that 
nations are free to delegate the authority to wage offensive war to an 
international organization. 153 It is arguable that the attempted delega-
tion of authority to the United Nations is itself a violation of classic 
just war doctrine. 
Since at least 1945, with the creation of the United Nations, there 
has been a radical departure from customary international law. The 
provisions of the U.N. Charter governing the use of force differ from 
customary law in two ways. First, the U.N. Charter attempts to mo-
nopolize the offensive use of force, thereby denying states that right. 154 
Second, the U.N. Charter permits United Nations-sanctioned force on 
grounds that are far more expansive than states are permitted under 
customary law. 155 The U.N. Charter does not limit the United Nations 
to defending states and enforcing judgments for legal wrongs. Rather, 
149 David Held, The Changing Structure of International Law: Sovereignty 
Transformed? in THE GWBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER 162 {2003) available at 
http://www.polity.co.uk/globaVpd£'GTReader2eHeld.pdf. 
150 VATTEL, supra note 17, at lviii. 
151 !d. 
152 The term jus cogen is found in Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on 
Treaties. It means "peremptory norm" or fundamental norm. Some interpret it to be a 
natural law principle because it may not be altered by treaty or custom. Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
153 U.N. Charter art. 39 & 43. 
154 I d., art. 2, para. 4 (prohibiting threats, and therefore, declarations of war); 
id., art. 51 (recognizing individual nations' right to resort to use of force only in self 
defense against armed attack). 
155 Jd., art. 39 & 42 (establishing Security Council privilege to use force); id., 
art. 55 (declaring that observance of human rights is a necessary condition for 
peace). 
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it allows the United Nations to secure peace by imposing a particular 
vision of social, political, economic, and ideological order that it per-
ceives to be in the global interest. These two facts place the U.N. 
Charter outside the pale of both customary international law and the 
just war doctrine. 
Although Professor Shi acknowledges that the U.N. Charter 
scheme gives special privileges to the great powers (i.e., members of 
the Security Council) and justifies armed intervention, he approves of 
it but wants to protect against abuses. 156 Apparently, he thinks there is 
common ground between East and West because he analogizes the 
mission of the United Nations to the ancient Chinese principle of 
heavenly kingdom and the Western vision of universal Christendom. 
But the U.N. Charter scheme is not of the same lineage as Augustine's 
vision of the universal church. At best it is mimicry. 
Medieval writers did not specifically address the question of 
whether a nation may delegate its sovereign right to exact justice by 
engaging in offensive war to an international organization. However, 
the issue is not totally novel. The medieval writers had a host of bibli-
cal and historical materials to draw upon if they were to directly ad-
dress the matter. For example, Augustine's The City of God is replete 
with appeals to Scripture and history. In that work, Augustine gave a 
theological explanation for man's sin and resulting wars. He dealt spe-
cifically with the biblical account of the Towel of Babel, in which God 
created a multiplicity of nations and spread them over the earth as a 
limitation on man's attempt to create a single political order to replace 
the Kingdom of God. 157 Augustine depicted Christ's earthly kingdom 
as comprised of a multitude of peoples, families, and languages. The 
church under the headship of Jesus Christ and His law provided the 
overarching basis for unity amongst a plurality of nations and fami-
lies.158 As seen through Augustine's examples, biblical Christianity 
holds that a multiplicity of nations with limited jurisdiction is a neces-
sary limitation on political, social, and economic evil. 
156 Shi, supra note 4, at 82-88. 
157 AUGUSTINE, supra note 38, at 425. See also Genesis 10; Genesis 11:1-9; 
Deuteronomy 32:8 (NIV) ("When the Most High gave the nations their inheritance, 
when he divided all mankind, he set up boundaries for the peoples according to the 
number of the sons of Israel."); Acts 17:26-27a (NIV) ("From one man he made 
every nation of men, that they should inhabit the whole earth; and he determined the 
times set for them and the exact places they should live. God did this so men would 
seek him."). 
158 AUGUSTINE, supra note 38, at 491. 
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Augustine also contrasted the Kingdom of God, which has univer-
sal jurisdiction, with several other ancient empires, which made ille-
gitimate claims to universal jurisdiction. The Christian worldview 
holds that a multiplicity of nations with limited jurisdiction was insti-
tuted by God as a limitation on political, social, and economic evil. 159 
Augustine's view is a direct contradiction to the new-world-order as-
sumptions embodied in the vision of the United Nations. 160 The under-
lying premise of one-world government schemes is that a multiplicity 
of nations is the cause of evil rather than a limitation upon it. 
The medieval writers further debated whether, among Christian 
rulers, the Holy Roman Emperor alone had the authority to wage of-
fensive war. Eventually, a consensus arose that lesser officials did 
have that right, but it remained difficult to determine at what level the 
right resided in the civil hierarchy. 161 In any event, the Emperor was 
unable to monopolize force then, just as the Security Council is unable 
to monopolize force today. 
3. Proportionality of Ends 
It is difficult to determine whether the requirement that the ends of 
a war be proportionate to the means is a legal requirement or a pruden-
tial one. Both options are probable. In either case, the requirement 
serves as a limiting factor on the use of force. If a decision is made to 
use force, it must be proportionate to the wrong done. Under the view 
that force is used to vindicate justice, punishment should be based on 
just desert162 and compensation for injury suffered. Proportionality is a 
159 Acts 17:6. 
160 Augustine based his view on the biblical passages from the prophet Daniel. 
Daniel 2:44 (NIV) ("In the time of those kings, the God of heaven will set up a 
kingdom that will never be destroyed, nor will it be left to another people. It will 
crush all those kingdoms and bring them to an end, but it will itself endure forever.") 
From chapters 7-11 of Daniel, it becomes clear that the four kingdoms mentioned in 
the second chapter of Daniel were Babylon, Medo-Persia, Greece, and ancient 
Rome. 
161 See RUSSELL, supra note 115, at 138-55. 
162 The theory of just desert combines the ideas that criminal punishments must 
be something that the criminal deserved and that the punishment is more fair if it is 
of a determinate rather than indeterminate duration. "[T]he goals of incapacitation 
and retribution carne to dominate, and in some quarters completely supersede, the 
goals of rehabilitation and deterrence in the minds of politicians and social theo-
rists." Hugo Adam Bedau, Punishment, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2005) available at http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
entries/punishment/. 
132 REGENT JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 6 
necessary corollary of the just cause element and is probably implied. 
These same principles are applicable to sanctions in a civil court pro-
ceeding. 
Proportionality is used, in another sense, as a prudential considera-
tion that focuses on the impact of war on a state's own citizens. It asks 
whether the costs of exacting justice exceed the benefits to be gained 
by waging war. 163 The cost in life and resources of prosecuting a war 
may be so great, or an injury so small, that it is better to forego the 
wrong. Pursuing a matter by force is often unjust, not to the wrong-
doer, but to the nation's own citizens. 
4. Reasonable Hope of Success 
The element of reasonable hope of success is clearly prudential in 
nature. 164 In fact, it seems to be a restatement of proportionality in the 
prudential sense as outlined above. 
5. Last Resort 
Last resort is primarily prudential and relates closely to propor-
tionality and reasonable hope of success. War is always costly and full 
of uncertainty. Therefore, nations are morally bound to pursue all 
peaceful means of settlement. This also ensures fairness to the other 
party. There is one legal component of this element which is a re-
quirement of both international and U.S. domestic law: a declaration 
of war. 165 Because declarations of war identify the just causes and are 
issued by lawful authority, they relate to elements one and two, above, 
as well. 
163 8 AUGUSTINE, supra note 3 , at 169. According to O'Brien: 
To begin with, the ends held out as the just cause must be sufficiently good 
and important to warrant the extreme means of war, the arbitrament of 
arms. Beyond that, a projection of the outcome of the war is required in 
which the probable good expected to result from success is weighed against 
the probable evil that the war will cause. 
O'BRIAN, supra note 110, at 27. There seems to have been little development or 
even recognition of this issue through most of the medieval period. However, the 
Bible counsels kings to make sound judgments concerning war. See, e.g., Luke 
14:31; Proverbs 24:6. 
164 O'BRJEN, supra note 110, at 27-28; AQUINAS, supra note 123, at 316-18. 
165 . . AQUINAS, supra note 123, at 316-18. C1ting Deuteronomy 20:10, Aqumas 
argued that declarations of war are a fundamental requirement of God's law binding 
all nations. !d. In the medieval period the context of discussion of declarations of 
war focused more on the issue of who had authority to initiate war. See RUSSELL, 
supra note 115, at 63, 64, 89. 
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6. Right Intention 
Even if all the above criteria were met, Augustine believed that 
one wages war unjustly if he does so out of hatred or other improper 
motives. 166 It is also important to check the nation's motives; wrong 
motives often lead to a breach of the external requirements. 
7. End of Peace 
The end of peace is another prudential concern. Peace is the su-
preme purpose for which war is waged. 167 By doing justice, the magis-
trate sets conditions for peaceful relationships. It is one of the meas-
ures of success and also an important component of intention; there-
fore, it might be included under either of those elements. Peace is not a 
mere cessation of fighting. Theologically speaking, peace is recon-
ciliation between enemies. 168 While satisfaction of justice does not 
necessarily bring about reconciliation, it is a necessary objective con-
d. . , .1. . 169 rtlon ,or reconcr ratiOn. 
C. The Weinberger Doctrine 
The main difference between just war doctrine and the Weinberger 
Doctrine is that the latter is a list of prudential criteria only. In fact, the 
whole Weinberger list can probably be subsumed under the element of 
"national interest." All of the other elements are particular considera-
tions that guide decision-makers in promoting the national interest. 
Weinberger's approach is very much like that of the nineteenth 
cenrury German military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, whose writings 
on war have enjoyed a modem resurgence of popularity within the 
166 See AUGUSTINE, supra note 38, at 175-76; AQUINAS, supra note 123, at 
578. Aquinas wrote that there are three elements of just war: (I) lawful authority; (2) 
just cause; and (3) right intention. The element of right intention entails several of 
the elements listed in this article. Aquinas, quoting from Augustine, states, "[t]rue 
religion does not look upon as sinful those war~ that are waged not for motives of 
aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-
doers, and of uplifting the good." !d. Properly waged, a just war is in the best interest 
of the offender as well. !d. 
167 
168 
AUGUSTINE, supra note 38, at 517. 
See id. at 519. 
169 Jeffrey C. Tuomala, Christ"s Atonement as the Model for Civil Justice, 38 
AM. J. JURJS. 223 (1993). 
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Department of Defense. 17° Clausewitz asserted: "We see, therefore, 
that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a 
continuation of political intercourse carried on with other means. What 
remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means."171 
Under modem theory, war is simply a prudential or political in-
strument whose distinguishing trait is violence. 172 Such a theory pur-
ports that war is used first and foremost to serve the national interest, 
regardless of how that political interest is defined. 173 
That view compliments the "national interest" approach to deci-
sion making. Under that view, one only need ask whether it is in the 
national interest that democracy will be promoted, terrorists deterred, 
human rights protected, prices on oil lowered, or political stability es-
tablished. If the answer is affirmative, and the objectives cannot be 
achieved by peaceful political intercourse, the use of force is "legiti-
mized." This view does not ask whether a legal wrong has been com-
mitted. The only limitation on an action is whether the political costs 
outweigh the expected benefits. At this juncture, Zhang's and Yao's 
criticism ofthe West as based on interest is well-founded. The applica-
tion of this view, Shi writes, caused the humiliation of China and re-
sulting distrust of the West. 174 It would hardly be surprising to find 
that many other countries harbor similar fear, distrust, and resentment. 
D. Law in Support of Policy 
A critical issue that underlies an analysis of just war doctrine is the 
relationship between law and policy. Great powers are perceived by 
others, and perhaps themselves, as acting solely on the basis of na-
tional interest with bare deference paid to legality. This is the view 
that China has of the West and under which Shi states that China has 
repeatedly received such humiliating treatment. 175 This highlights a 
fundamental problem-the perception that law and sound foreign pol-
icy are incompatible. Compliance with law is seen as an impediment 
170 See Anthony F. Sidoti, Abstract, The Relevance of Carl Von Clausewitz in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom, AIR & SPACE POWER J., Jan. 21, 2004, 
http:i/www.airpower.rnaxwell.afmillairchronicles/cc/sidoti.html. 
71 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Pare! trans., 
1976) (1832). 
172 Id 
173 
174 
175 
Weinberger, supra note 117, at 440-43. 
Shi, supra note 4, at 70-73. 
!d. at 70-73,76-77. 
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to policy implementation and as a severe handicap when dealing with 
other nations not similarly encumbered. 
The proper relationship between law and policy can be demon-
strated in considering the familiar adage that "honesty is the best pol-
icy." This adage entails several assumptions. The first is that immuta-
ble standards of conduct exist, which are based on something other 
than expediency. The second is that doing what is right is not simply 
compatible with policy; it is the first step in sound policy decision-
making. Finally, this adage assumes a view of reality in which compli-
ance with the dictates of right conduct guarantees the attainment of 
true self-interest. The same should be said about law-"legality is the 
best policy." Of course, this analysis assumes that there are immutable 
and knowable standards of right and wrong and that they form the ba-
sis of the legal system. 
The medieval just war writers and the great commentators on cus-
tomary international law did not have the theoretical problem of the 
incompatibility of law and policy. As God is the Creator of all men 
and the author of law, law applies to all people for all of time. These 
writers believed that there are immutable principles of divine or natu-
ral law revealed to men and nations. Consequently, justice is insepara-
ble from sound policy, and a breach of justice is never expedient or 
sound policy. That belief presupposes that positive law and policy de-
cisions are made in the context of, and in conformity to, a law order 
and superintending will that rules over nations and the affairs of men. 
It is the Christian's-including the Christian statesman's-assurance 
that compliance with law is always the best policy. 
The extreme tension between the demands of law and policy is a 
product of legal positivism. Law, for the positivist, is nothing but one 
more political instrument to achieve policy objectives or to engineer a 
particular social or world order. When the legal instrument proves in-
effective, nations resort to more expedient means. What begins as an 
implementation of policy by positive law becomes, as Clausewitz ar-
gued, an extension of policy by military force. 176 
The legal positivist lives in a world of his own making in which 
nothing is a given. He chooses both the ends of the social order, and, 
through political and social experimentation, the best means of achiev-
ing those ends. Law is not right or wrong; it is simply effective or inef-
fective as an instrument of political and social control. That strikes the 
176 CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 171, at 87. 
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very heart of the Western legal tradition and the blessings of freedom 
which it birthed. 
PART IV- CONCLUSION 
A sharp contrast exists between Chinese and non-Christian West-
em worldviews on one hand and the Christian worldview as articu-
lated in this article on the other. This contrast is vividly illustrated in 
the Apostle Paul's confrontation with the non-Christian Western phi-
losophers in Athens. 177 They told Paul that he had brought strange 
teachings to their ears. 178 Paul proclaimed to them that all men and all 
nations are created by God and subj.ect to judgment according to laws 
which govern all men and nations.1 9 
Although peoples of the geographic West may have been among 
the first to embrace these truths, men everywhere will fmd a basis for 
unity amongst their diversity of families and nations, not in their 
common humanity, but in their union with Christ Jesus. 180 He prom-
ised that "[p ]eople will come from east and west and north and south 
and will take their places at the feast in the kingdom of God."181 Be-
cause God is the Creator of all men and nations, even the smallest and 
most scattered of nations can place their hope in His law, which is 
177 
178 
Acts 17:16-34. 
Acts 17:6-8. 
179 Acts 17:24-31; See also BERMAN, supra note 10, at 63 (showing that the 
Germaoic tribes, though geographically western, had a similar difficulty in grasping 
the implications of a cosmology of creation, even after their "conversion" to Christi-
anity). 
In general, Christian beliefs and practices had a great appeal to Germanic 
man. They brought him, for the first time, a positive attitude toward life and 
toward death, a larger purpose into which to fit the tragedies and mysteries 
of his existence. Beside Christianity the old pagan myths seemed harsh and 
bleak. One can sense the passion in King Alfred's words, in the famous 
"Addition" to his translation of Boethius, "I say, as do all Christian men, 
that it is a divine purpose that rules, and not fate." At the same time, the 
Christian cosmology and the Christian ethic were not easy for Germanic 
man to grasp. If taken seriously, they threatened to undermine not only his 
former system of beliefs but also his entire social order. 
ld. Berman believes that Eastern Orthodoxy is closer to first millennium Germanic 
Christianity than it is to second millennium Roman Catholic and Protestant theology 
in terms of impact on social institutions, which perhaps explains the weak develop-
ment of rule oflaw and constitutionalism the further east one travels in Europe. 
180 See Galatians 3:26-29. 
181 Luke 13:29 (NIV). 
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common to all, 182 and which wovides the standard of justice for judg-
ing disputes between nations. 83 
Additionally, God has established a plurality of social groups in-
cluding the family, the church, and the state, each with its separate 
jurisdiction, but each operating under God's law. To families, He has 
given jurisdiction to raise and educate children, engage in economic 
activities, and provide for the needs of their members. 184 To the 
church, He has given the keys of the kingdom of heaven that men eve-
rywhere might hear and receive the message that salvation is through 
faith in Christ alone and that they might be tau&ht the truths of Scrip-
ture and its application to every area of life. 18 To the state, He has 
given the power to establish civil government.186 God had a purpose 
for establishing a plurality of civil jurisdictions. He did this "so that 
men would seek him and perhaps reach out for him and find him 
though he is not far from each one ofus."187 
182 Isaiah 42:4. 
183 Isaiah 2:4 (NIV) ("He [God] will judge between the nations and will settle 
disputes for many peoples. They will beat their swords into plowshares and their 
spears into pruning hooks. Nation will not take up sword against nation, nor will 
they train for war anymore."). This near-universal hope for international peace is 
expressed in tbe statne titled, "Let Us Beat Swords into Plowshares." Ironically, tbat 
statne sits in a park adjacent to tbe United Nations complex in New York City. Per-
haps more ironic still is the fact that tbe statne was a gift of tbe Soviet Union in 
1959. 
184 
5:3-4. 
185 
186 
187 
See. e.g., Genesis 1:28; Deuteronomy 6:4-8; Ephesians 5:22-6:4; I Timothy 
See. e.g., Matthew 16:13-20; Romans 10:13-15; 2 Timothy 3:16-17. 
See. e.g., Genesis 9:6; Romans 13:1-7. 
Acts 17:27 (NIV). 
